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THE MADNESS OF INSANE DELUSIONS
Kevin Bennardo*

In the United States, the law of wills professes to be organized around
the principle of freedom of testation. “Work and earn and save,” it
says, “so that you can pass your wealth to whomever you please.”
This principle is attractive, but it simply is not borne out in the
administration of too many testators’ estates. Rather, judges and
juries routinely substitute their preferred distributions for testators’
expressed preferences.
One particularly troubling situation arises when testators attempt to
pass their estates to organizations that champion unpopular beliefs. If
the deciding judges or juries dislike the testators’ beliefs, they may be
tempted to invalidate these devises as the product of insane delusions.
Sometimes these supposed “delusions” have been beliefs about
divisive social issues—like advancing women in the early twentieth
century. Other supposed “delusions” have been religious beliefs that
depart from the mainstream faiths. Allowing judges and juries to label
these beliefs “delusional” does not further testamentary freedom.
Rather, it substitutes majoritarian preferences for the countermajoritarian views of the testator. This is a dangerous proposition. It
was once regarded as fact that the Earth was flat. Now the prevalent
view is that the Earth is round. Should a devise that champions either
one of those ideas be labeled “delusional”? Unfortunately, the
outcome may be dictated by the popular opinion of the testator’s
times.

*
The Author is a Clinical Associate Professor of Law at the University of North
Carolina School of Law and a Non-Resident Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
Republic of Palau. Thank you to Al Brophy, Alexa Chew, Mark Glover, and John Orth for
their feedback on earlier versions of the idea or drafts of this manuscript. Thank you to Tara
Summerville (UNC 2019) for her excellent research assistance.
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This Article shares two ideas for reform. First, the doctrine of insane
delusions should not be applied to devises that seek to advance beliefs,
ideas, or viewpoints. There is just too great of a risk that judges and
juries will strike down such devises when the testator’s viewpoints
diverge from their own.
Second, the time may have come to admit that the law of wills is not
as committed to the principle of testamentary freedom as it is often
espoused to be. The literature is rife with examples of a latent norm of
familial support. Currently, this norm is expressed when judges and
juries manipulate flexible doctrines to distribute decedents’ estates to
decedents’ family members against decedents’ stated preferences.
Perhaps it is time for the law to expressly acknowledge that familial
support is important in our society and reserve a share of every
decedent’s estate for distribution to the decedent’s family. The second
proposal set forth in this Article, “the forced intestate share,” would
compel distribution of a portion of each estate to the decedent’s
intestate takers. Adopting some version of this proposal may actually
afford testators with greater testamentary freedom overall because,
by expressly fulfilling the norm of familial support, it would reduce
decision-makers’ biased tendencies to invalidate devises to nonfamily
members. Indeed, the counterintuitive solution to achieving greater
actual testamentary freedom may be to remove testators’ control over
some share of their estates through a forced intestate share.
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INTRODUCTION
Even a first-day student of decedents’ estates class knows that the law of
wills in the United States is organized around the principle of freedom of
disposition.1 Subject to limited exceptions, the testator’s wishes trump all else.2 And
it’s not even close. Sure, other countries have systems that mandate familial support
by decedents, but not us.3 We’re all about freedom here. Right?
Well, no. At least, not exactly. By and large, testamentary freedom is not
about valuing personal choice. Rather, its purpose is to create an incentive for
individuals to accumulate and conserve wealth and discourage wastefulness.4
Without testamentary freedom, we are told, individuals would be deterred from
working and would recklessly spend through their assets.5
Creating incentives is all about appearances. Credibility, rather than the
result, is the coin of the realm. Thus, if the goal is truly to create incentives to earn
and save, then the organizing principle of the law of wills is not achieving the result
of testamentary freedom. Rather, the organizing principle is creating the appearance
of testamentary freedom. The appearance of freedom is both sufficient and
necessary to achieve the goal of incentivizing behavior. Actual freedom is
unnecessary.
Placing this subtle lens over the law of wills explains much about how the
doctrine is actually applied. The administration of the law of wills is at odds with
the professed theoretical exaltation of testamentary freedom of disposition. The
disconnect between the theory and the administration creates a con game of sorts.
It’s a classic bait and switch. “Hey, you, come over here,” beckons the theory.
“Work and earn and save through your life.” Why? “Because when you die, you
control what happens to your estate.” So, you buy into the system. You work and
earn and save, and—ever importantly—you make a will. Then you die. And what
happens next? Unless your preferences square with the prevailing societal norms
regarding familial duty, the administration of the law of wills may do its damnedest
to undermine your preferred devises. Want to leave your estate to the Flat Earth
Society? Sorry, but that type of devise just might be deemed the product of an insane
delusion. After your demise, a judge or jury may well decide to invalidate the devise
and distribute your estate to the natural objects of your bounty instead. By that point,
you won’t be around to cause a fuss.6

1.
See Robert H. Sitkoff, Trusts and Estates: Implementing Freedom of
Disposition, 58 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 643, 643 (2014) (suggesting that a trusts and estates course
can be organized around the principle of freedom of disposition to match the law’s
organization around the same principle in this area of the law).
2.
See infra Section I.A.
3.
See infra Section I.C.
4.
See infra Section I.A.
5.
See infra Section I.A.
6.
Applying the familiar principle of “once bitten, twice shy,” see, e.g., GREAT
WHITE, ONCE BITTEN, TWICE SHY (Capitol Records 1989), the testator is necessarily deceased
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This Article builds upon previous research that has demonstrated that the
current administration of the law of wills is much more likely to effectuate
testamentary freedom when a testator’s devises align with cultural norms,
particularly with the norm of familial support and maintenance.7 Judges and juries
are simply less likely to carry out devises that depart from the mainstream. If a
testator wishes to leave her estate to her spouse, her kids, or her siblings, a judge or
a jury is more likely to carry that out—all in the name of furthering testamentary
freedom. But if a testator tries to cut close relatives out of her estate plan or to
distribute her estate in a way that strikes many people as unfair, the result is a much
higher likelihood that the will or the devise will be found to be invalid.8 Such is not
a system of true testamentary freedom.
This Article focuses on abuses of the doctrine of insane delusions.9 If a
testator wishes to leave her estate to an organization that champions an unpopular
message, she risks invalidation of the devise as an insane delusion. Such devises that
sought to advance women or certain nonmainstream religions have been invalidated
as delusional in the past.10 In our increasingly divided society, there is little to stop
a judge or jury from labeling all manner of beliefs delusional, be they religious,
political, or social in nature.11 Selecting which beliefs are “true” and “false” should
not be the decision-maker’s role, particularly when set against the backdrop of
testamentary freedom.
This Article proposes two potential reforms. First, it counsels courts to stop
applying the doctrine of insane delusions to devises that seek to advance certain
beliefs or viewpoints.12 Second, it suggests that testamentary freedom may actually
be advanced by taking away testators’ freedom of disposition over a portion of their
estates.13 If decision-makers are irreparably biased in favor of devises to close family
members, then perhaps it is time that the law acknowledges the bias and satiates it.
To that end, this Article proposes a “forced intestate share,” in which some portion
(say, 20%) of a testator’s estate would automatically be distributed to the decedent’s
surviving family members. By forcing the fulfillment of the decision-maker’s
majoritarian preference for familial support, a system of forced partial intestacy
would hopefully make the decision-maker more open to fairly assessing and
carrying out a decedent’s counter-majoritarian devises. In other words, the forced
intestate share is a tribute—a payment to fulfill the majoritarian sense of familial
duty—that may actually have the result of increasing the testator’s actual freedom
of disposition over the rest of her estate.
This Article proceeds in three parts. First, it provides some necessary
background on testamentary freedom as the theoretical framework around which the
by the time she is bitten by the administration of the law of wills. Administration of a
decedent’s estate only occurs once. Thus, she lacks an opportunity to be shy of it in the future.
7.
See infra Section III.A.
8.
See infra Section III.A.
9.
See infra Part II.
10.
See infra Section II.B.
11.
See infra Section II.B.
12.
See infra Section III.A.
13.
See infra Section III.B.
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law of estates is supposedly molded in the United States. In Part I, the Article
identifies the traditional rationales for prioritizing freedom of disposition, notes
where the law purposefully departs from this rationale, and explains how other
countries do it differently. Then, Part II chronicles the doctrine of insane delusions,
particularly how the doctrine is applied to devises that seek to advance specific
beliefs. Lastly, Part III sets forth the two reforms described in the preceding
paragraph.

I. THE APPEARANCE OF TESTAMENTARY FREEDOM
The law governing decedents’ estates in the United States is obsessed with
testamentary freedom. The emphasis is on the donor rather than the donee.14 Indeed,
a donee possesses no cognizable legal rights until after the donor’s demise.15 This
Part explores the law’s fixation on testamentary freedom and the purposes that this
freedom is meant to serve. It also identifies exceptions—areas in which a testator’s
freedom is limited. Finally, it examines systems of succession in other countries to
highlight the uniqueness of the American fascination with freedom of disposition.
A. The American Obsession with Testamentary Freedom
The concept of testamentary freedom is foundational to the law of
decedents’ estates in the United States.16 It is, after all, the “controlling
consideration” and the “organizing principle” motivating policy decisions in this
area of the law.17 As the “first principle of the law of wills,” testamentary freedom
is paramount.18 Everything else is secondary. Students of decedents’ estates learn it
on day one,19 and it recurs throughout the doctrine as an ever-ready explanation for
almost every policy decision in this area of the law.20

14.
Sitkoff, supra note 1, at 644.
15.
Id.
16.
See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, DEAD HANDS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF WILLS,
TRUSTS, AND INHERITANCE LAW 19, 46 (2009) (“Freedom of testation is supposed to be the
guiding principle of modern law. In essence, you can leave your money to anybody you
choose to leave it to. . . . This is a fundamental principle of law. It is also, apparently, a
fundamental social norm.”); Mark Glover, A Social Welfare Theory of Inheritance
Regulation, 2018 UTAH L. REV. 411, 414 & n.5 (referring to testamentary freedom as “the
bedrock principle in the modern law of succession” and listing supporting sources).
17.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 10.1 & cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2003).
18.
John H. Langbein, Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act, 88 HARV. L.
REV. 489, 491 (1975). This proposition is so central that Professor Langbein did not even cite
authority for it.
19.
See Sitkoff, supra note 1, at 644 (noting that “the nature and function of
freedom of disposition” is one of the topics that ought to be taught “at the outset of the Trusts
and Estates course”).
20.
Not all commentators agree that testamentary freedom should be so dominant.
See, e.g., Jeffrey Evans Stake, Biologically Biased Beneficence, 48 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1101, 1101
(2016) (identifying testamentary biases and concluding that “testamentary freedom should be
demoted from the organizing principle to an important consideration in the design of the law
of succession”).
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Why testamentary freedom? Freedom of testation is often justified as a
means to produce net-positive outcomes. In other words, it creates incentives for
individuals to act in ways that, on the whole, benefit society at large.21 Allowing
individuals to select their post-death beneficiaries encourages them to work and earn
and save so that they may pass along their wealth.22 On the donee side, freedom of
testation creates an incentive for would-be beneficiaries to care for soon-to-be
decedents in the hope or anticipation of being remembered in the decedent’s will—
or at least not to ignore soon-to-be decedents in the hope of not getting disinherited.23
Aside from the beneficial incentives, testators are also viewed as having
superior information regarding how wealth should be divided among family
members.24 Even if the government wished to pass wealth along family lines, it
would necessarily have to paint with a broad brush.25 An individual testator, on the
other hand, knows much more about the intricacies of her family, including which
potential beneficiaries are in the greatest need or could put a devise to the greatest
use.26 Additionally, testamentary freedom is also said to produce utility in the form
of added happiness or gratification during the testator’s lifetime.27
Finally, as further support for testamentary freedom, commentators have
observed that lack of testamentary freedom would incentivize all manner of suboptimal behavior. If individuals lacked control over the distribution of their estates,
not only would they lack the incentive to amass sizable estates, but they would
21.
See Mark Glover, Freedom of Inheritance, 2017 UTAH L. REV. 283, 291
(“[F]reedom of disposition promotes the maximization of societal wealth.”); Adam J. Hirsch,
Freedom of Testation / Freedom of Contract, 95 MINN. L. REV. 2180, 2186 (2011) (“Whether
or not we deem it a good per se, economic autonomy facilitates our obtaining other goods.”).
22.
Glover, supra note 21, at 291; Hirsch, supra note 21, at 2187 (“Giving persons
the right to make a will therefore encourages them to produce and save more wealth, again
adding to the sum of capital stock.”).
23.
Glover, supra note 21, at 291 (“The possibility of disinheritance incentivizes
the provision of family caregiving, which in turn promotes overall social welfare.”); Hirsch,
supra note 21, at 2187–88 (“Freedom of testation can simultaneously give rise to a virtual
market for reciprocal altruistic transfers, beneficiaries providing social services that
benefactors value in implicit exchange for a share of their estates.”).
24.
Hirsch, supra note 21, at 2189 (“Assuming a family is tied together by bonds
of affection, leaving estate plans to owners’ discretion exploits their knowledge (and hence
their comparative advantage as contrasted with legislators or courts) to devise a plan that
enhances the family’s welfare.”); Adam J. Hirsch & William K.S. Wang, A Qualitative
Theory of the Dead Hand, 68 IND. L.J. 1, 12 (1992) (labeling this the “father knows best”
hypothesis).
25.
See Glover, supra note 21, at 290 (“Donors likely have a better understanding
of how to distribute their wealth upon death in a way that maximizes the utility of donees
rather than the policymakers who would direct the disposition of estates in the absence of
freedom of disposition.”).
26.
See id.
27.
See id. (“Freedom of disposition could . . . be explained as promoting social
welfare by providing a source of happiness and satisfaction to individual donors.”); Hirsch,
supra note 21, at 2187 (“Although benefactors cannot share in a beneficiary’s utility from an
inheritance at the time of its receipt, they can envision it, and derive present utility from its
anticipation.”).
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actually be incentivized to spend their wealth down to zero or to take back control
by giving away their wealth through inter vivos transfers.28 If this practice were not
perfectly timed, the result would be the impoverishment of a large number of elderly
individuals who gave their wealth away too hastily as lifetime gifts. Such an
outcome would not be viewed positively by the society that would then take up
supporting them through tax-funded social benefits.29 Thus, freedom of testation
makes it more likely that individuals will hold onto their wealth long enough to
support themselves through the ends of their lives.
In fostering testamentary freedom, the law of wills occasionally goes
beyond simply effectuating a decedent’s expressed intent. In certain situations, the
law guesses at a testator’s likely preferences and carries them out, particularly when
a will—a “delayed-action document”—has grown stale in the wake of more recent
developments.30 In these matters, the law is guided by its best guesses at the likely
preferences of the typical decedent. The law will intervene to alter the distribution
of the testator’s estate when it is deemed likely that the testator wished to update her
estate plan but simply did not.31 For example, a spouse or issue acquired by the
testator after the execution of the testator’s will is deemed “pretermitted.”32 Unless
the testator has indicated otherwise, a portion of the estate will be distributed to a
pretermitted spouse or issue even though they were not mentioned in the testator’s
will.33 In a similar vein, divorce revokes any devise made to a former spouse (and
potentially to a former spouse’s relatives), even when the testator takes no
affirmative steps to revise the will after the divorce.34 These types of alterations are
thought to effectuate the results most in keeping with the typical testator’s intent—
in effect, the law presumes that the testator simply failed to keep her estate plan up
to date with her preferences.35

28.
See Glover, supra note 21, at 288 (“Even if the law attempted to sever[e]ly
limit the ability to dispose of property upon death, for example by eliminating disposition of
property by will, people would find ways around these limitations, such as by transferring
property during life or by other means designed to transfer property at death.”); Hirsch &
Wang, supra note 24, at 11.
29.
See, e.g., Note, Dethroning the Welfare Queen: The Rhetoric of Reform,
107 HARV. L. REV. 2013, 2013 (1994) (discussing the vilification of welfare recipients and
the welfare system).
30.
John V. Orth, Second Thoughts in the Law of Property, 10 GREEN BAG 2D 65,
71 (2006); see also Kevin Bennardo, Slaying Contingent Beneficiaries, 24 U. MIAMI BUS. L.
REV. 31, 42–43 (2015).
31.
See Bennardo, supra note 30, at 42.
32.
Id. at 44. The construction of the term issue has prompted considerable debate.
See Merrill I. Schnebly, Testamentary Gifts to “Issue,” 35 YALE L.J. 571, 571 (1926).
However, it is generally understood to simply mean an individual’s descendants. E.g., UNIF.
PROBATE CODE § 1-201(24) (amended 2010).
33.
UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-301(b) (spouses), 2-302 (issue) (amended 2010).
34.
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-804(b)(1) (amended 2010).
35.
See, e.g., Gier v. Deoneseus (In re Estate of Deoneseus), 906 P.2d 922, 923
(Wash. 1995) (stating that the purpose of pretermitted-spouse provisions is “to prevent the
unintentional disinheritance of the surviving spouse of a testator who marries after making a
will and then dies without ever changing it”).
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B. Exceptions to Testamentary Freedom
Of course, the law does not grant a testator unlimited freedom of
distribution. There are some devises that simply will not be sustained, no matter how
clearly communicated.36 Devises that conflict with other strongly held public
policies will not be upheld.37 For example, the law will not give effect to conditions
on devises that restrict marital freedom or encourage illegal behavior.38 In almost
every state, a testator is not permitted to leave her estate to her slayer.39 While the
general rule that a slayer may not inherit from her victim is partially grounded in the
concept of testamentary freedom—the typical decedent likely would not want to
leave her estate to her slayer but lacks the time and opportunity to update her will as
she is being slayed—the law goes one step further and makes the rule a mandatory
one unalterable by the decedent.40 Thus, the law will not carry out a devise
commanding the distribution of assets to a particular beneficiary “even if he kills
me.”41 This result, which runs contrary to testamentary freedom, is supported by the
equitable doctrine that a wrongdoer may not profit from her wrong.42
A decedent’s surviving spouse is protected from total disinheritance.43
Aside from the spouse, however, U.S. law does not expressly protect other family
members. A testator is free to disinherit children, including minor children.44 While
this extreme level of testamentary freedom has been criticized, especially as applied
to minor children—whom parents have a legal obligation to support while the
parents are alive45—such freedom persists in the United States. The one exception
is Louisiana where, under the civil law tradition, children may only be disinherited
for just cause.46 Elsewhere in this country, testamentary freedom gives way only to
the spouse; all other relatives take only at the testator’s fancy.

36.
See Orth, supra note 30, at 73 (“[I]n some cases the testator’s actual intention
is known, not merely presumed, but crossed nonetheless.”).
37.
See Ronald J. Scalise Jr., Public Policy and Antisocial Testators, 32 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1315, 1326–32 (2011).
38.
See id. (overviewing kinds of conditions placed on devises that have been held
to be contrary to public policy).
39.
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-803(b) (amended 2010).
40.
See Bennardo, supra note 30, at 37–38.
41.
See id.
42.
See id. at 38–39.
43.
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-202 (amended 2010). Protection of surviving
spouses is described infra in Subsection III.B.2.
44.
See JESSE DUKEMINIER & ROBERT H. SITKOFF, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES
556 (9th ed. 2013).
45.
See Stake, supra note 20, at 1117–18 (“For decades, American academics have
argued to no avail that states should do more to protect children from disinheritance.”); see
also Glover, supra note 16, at 442 (“The donor’s discretion to disinherit children stands in
stark contrast with her legal obligation to support her minor children during life. . . . [B]y
dying with an estate plan that omits her minor children, the donor can shift the cost of child
support from herself to others.”).
46.
LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1621 (Westlaw through 2018 1st Extraordinary Sess.).
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C. A Comparative Perspective from Abroad
Most other countries don’t do it this way. American law “embraces
freedom of disposition, authorizing dead hand control, to an extent that is unique
among modern legal systems.”47 As Professor Melanie Leslie pointedly put it, “[t]he
United States alone insists on paying lip service to the idea that testamentary
freedom is preeminent.”48 Other countries’ testamentary systems are not obsessed
solely with elevating freedom of testation, but rather balance freedom of testation
against family-support obligations. In most Western countries, a significant portion
of a decedent’s estate will be distributed to the family of the decedent, even if that
result runs counter to the distributive intent manifested in the decedent’s will.49 This
is true of both common law and civil law countries.50
In common law countries, these rules generally take the form of familymaintenance statutes.51 Such statutes do not reserve a specific portion of the
decedent’s estate for children, spouses, or other heirs, but rather grant discretion to
the court to deviate from the terms of the will in order to make the distribution more
equitable in support of eligible claimants.52 For example, in England and Wales, a
family member53 who was financially supported by the decedent “may apply to the
court for an order for ‘reasonable financial provision’ out of the deceased’s estate if,
by reason of the deceased’s will or intestacy, they do not receive reasonable financial

47.
Sitkoff, supra note 1, at 643–44.
48.
Melanie B. Leslie, The Myth of Testamentary Freedom, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 235,
273 (1996).
49.
Id. at 270 (“Most other Western countries expressly acknowledge a strong
public policy of restricting freedom of testation to protect dependents, family members and
others who are viewed as having a claim on a decedent’s assets.”); Ralph C. Brashier,
Disinheritance and the Modern Family, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 83, 117 n.111 (1994) (“Most
of the civilized countries in the world provide direct protection from disinheritance to children
of a testator.”).
50.
See Ray D. Madoff, A Tale of Two Countries: Comparing the Law of
Inheritance in Two Seemingly Opposite Systems, 37 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 333, 336
(2014) (“[M]ost of the common law countries other than the United States have modified their
laws to provide greater protection for families by enacting family maintenance statutes.”);
Brashier, supra note 49, at 117 (“Forced heirship is a characteristic of the laws of succession
in civil law countries . . . .”).
51.
See RAY D. MADOFF, IMMORTALITY AND THE LAW 59 (2010); Leslie, supra
note 48, at 270–73 (summarizing family-protection systems in England and Canada);
Brashier, supra note 49, at 121–22 & n.128 (chronicling the history of family-maintenance
statutes from New Zealand, England, Australia, and Canada); Stake, supra note 20,
at 1116–17.
52.
See MADOFF, supra note 51, at 59–60 (overviewing the English familymaintenance system); Brashier, supra note 49, at 124–25 (observing that the English familymaintenance statute “effectively permits a judge not only to alter the testamentary wishes of
the decedent, but also to do so in a highly discretionary manner” with no “well-defined
guidelines”).
53.
Or a person with whom the decedent had a family-like relationship. See John
Wood, England and Wales, in INTERNATIONAL SUCCESSION 255, 260–61 (Louis Garb & John
Wood, eds., 4th ed. 2015) (listing eligible relationships).
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provision.”54 The court then has the authority to order that a portion of the estate be
distributed to the applicant.55
On the other hand, civil law countries typically protect descendants from
disinheritance through forced heirship (also known as forced succession).56 For
example, in France “[t]he legal right to an inheritance is one of the cornerstones” of
the law of succession.57 This focus on the beneficiary’s right to inherit stands in stark
contrast to the American focus on the decedent’s right to bequeath. French law
strikes a balance that places much more emphasis on the donee side of the equation.
Under this system, the estate is divided among the “disposable share” and
“compulsory shares.”58 French decedents have freedom to direct the disposition only
of the disposable shares of their estates.59 Compulsory shares are generally reserved
for the decedent’s direct descendants and can consume up to three-quarters of the
estate.60 Thus, a testator may control as little as one-quarter of the estate.

II. INSANE DELUSIONS
Under the Uniform Probate Code, a “sound mind” is necessary to make a
will.61 Every state and territory has adopted a similar requirement.62 The threshold
54.
Id. at 261.
55.
Id.
56.
MADOFF, supra note 51, at 58–59; see also Brashier, supra note 49, at 117–21
(overviewing forced heirship in France and Louisiana); Ryan McLearen, Comment,
International Forced Heirship: Concerns and Issues with European Forced Heirship Claims,
3 EST. PLAN. & CMTY. PROP. L.J. 323, 326–28 (2011) (overviewing forced heirship in France,
Germany, and Italy).
57.
Frank Lipworth et al., France, in INTERNATIONAL SUCCESSION 275, 280 (Louis
Garb & John Wood, eds., 4th ed. 2015).
58.
Id. at 280–81.
59.
Id. at 281.
60.
Id. The compulsory share is one-half if the decedent has one child, two-thirds
if the decedent has two children, and three-quarters if the decedent has three or more children.
Id. A surviving spouse is only due a one-quarter compulsory share, and only if the decedent
lacked any surviving descendants. Id. Subject to some exceptions, however, a surviving
spouse is entitled to half of the couple’s community property. Id. at 283.
61.
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-501 (amended 2010) (“An individual 18 or more
years of age who is of sound mind may make a will.”).
62.
Of 55 domestic jurisdictions (including the District of Columbia, Guam, the
Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands), 48 have adopted a
“sound mind” as the required mental capacity. See ALA. CODE § 43-8-130 (1982); ALASKA
STAT. § 13.12.501 (1996); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2501 (1994); ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 28-25-101 (1949); CAL. PROB. CODE § 6100(a) (2009); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-501
(1994); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-250 (1988); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 201 (1995); D.C.
CODE § 18-102 (1976); FLA. STAT. § 732.501 (2002); 15 GUAM CODE ANN. § 101(a) (1970);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 560:2-501 (1996); IDAHO CODE § 15-2-501 (1971); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/4-1 (2016); IND. CODE § 29-1-5-1 (1953); IOWA CODE § 633.264 (2006); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 59-601 (1939); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 394.020 (West, Westlaw through certain laws
effective July 14, 2018); ME. STAT. tit. 18-a, § 2-501 (1981); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 190B,
§ 2-501 (2008); MINN. STAT. § 524.2-501 (1975); MISS. CODE ANN. § 91-5-1 (1973); MO.
REV. STAT. § 474.310 (1999); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-521 (1993); NEB. REV. STAT.
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for general testamentary capacity is low, but it is skewed in favor of familial support.
A testator will be deemed mentally incapable of drafting a valid will if she cannot
recognize her property or her family members as the natural objects of her bounty.63
These are the only mistaken beliefs that will automatically lead to the invalidation
of an entire will. Even grossly mistaken beliefs regarding other aspects of the
testator’s world will not lead to a finding of lack of mental capacity.64 In effect, the
law assumes that a testator should want to leave assets to her family, and if she
cannot recognize her family then the entire estate plan is invalid. But if the testator
is mistaken about other topics that are presumably less important to estate planning,
the plan is not necessarily invalidated. This is an example of a doctrine that reflects
using familial support as the norm, rather than taking a truly neutral approach to
testamentary freedom.
While mental incapacity will invalidate a testator’s entire will, an insane
delusion on a particular topic will only invalidate specific devises that were the
§ 30-2326 (1974); NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.020 (1957); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:3-1 (2005); N.Y.
EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 3-1.1 (1966); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-1 (2012); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 30.1-08-01 (1973); 8 N. MAR. I. CODE § 2301 (through PL 20-59),
http://cnmilaw.org/pdf/cmc_section/T8/2301.pdf; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.02 (2012);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 41 (1992); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 122.225 (West, Westlaw through
2018 Reg. Sess. Emergency Legis.); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2501 (1976); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit.
31, §§ 2111, 2112 (1930); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-501 (2013); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 29A-2-501 (1995); TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-1-102 (1941); TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 251.001
(2017); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-501 (1998); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14 § 1 (2017); V.I. CODE
ANN. tit. 15, § 7 (1957); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-401 (2012); WASH. REV. CODE § 11.12.010
(1970); W. VA. CODE § 41-1-2 (1957); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 853.01 (West, Westlaw through
2017 Act 367); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 2-6-101 (1980).
Of the remaining seven states, two set the standard at a “sane mind.” N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 551:1 (Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess.); 33 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-5-2 (1988).
Maryland requires a testator to be “legally competent.” MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS
§ 4-101 (1974). New Mexico requires a testator to “hav[e] capacity.” N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 45-2A-3 (1991). Georgia disallows testation by those “laboring under some legal disability
arising either from a want of capacity or a want of perfect liberty of action.” GA. CODE ANN.
§ 53-4-10 (1996); see also GA. CODE ANN. § 53-4-11(a) (1996) (defining testamentary
capacity as “a decided and rational desire as to the disposition of property”). The sole civil
code state, Louisiana, requires that the testator “be able to comprehend generally the nature
and consequences of the disposition that he is making.” LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art 1477 (1991).
Michigan has some of the most detailed statutory law in this area, enumerating four conditions
for mental capacity in the testamentary context. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 700.2501 (2009); see
also CAL. PROB. CODE § 6100.5 (1995) (enumerating circumstances that disqualify an
individual from mental competence to make a will).
63.
See Adam J. Hirsch, Testation and the Mind, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 285,
330 (2017) (“The sound mind doctrine tests testators’ abilities to recognize the people to
whom, and the property with which, they might wish to bequeath. The doctrine is
unconcerned with the loss of ability to recognize other things.”).
64.
Id. As stated by one court, mistaken beliefs on “racial, religious, economic, or
medical questions” have no bearing on a testator’s mental capacity to make a will “[s]o
long . . . as the natural objects of one’s bounty are not members of the race, or sect, against
which the prejudice is directed.” Newman v. Dixon Bank & Tr. Co., 265 S.W. 456, 458 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1924).
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product of the delusion.65 The doctrine of insane delusions rarely appears directly in
the statutory law but is instead developed through judicial decisions.66 The
commentary to the Restatement (Third) of Property provides the majority rule for
insane delusions:
An insane delusion is a belief that is so against the evidence and
reason that it must be the product of derangement. A belief
resulting from a process of reasoning from existing facts is not an
insane delusion, even though the reasoning is imperfect or the
conclusion illogical. Mere eccentricity does not constitute an
insane delusion.67
An insane delusion is different than a mere mistaken belief in that “[a] mistake is
susceptible to correction if the testator is told the truth,” but an insane delusion is an
erroneous belief “to which the testator adheres against all evidence and reason to the
contrary.”68 If an insane delusion is detected, the remedy is not to invalidate the
entire will. Rather, the particular devise is invalid “to the extent that it was the
product of an insane delusion.”69 Thus, to invalidate a devise under the doctrine of
insane delusions, the party contesting the will must show both that the testator
suffered from an insane delusion and that the delusion caused the contested devise.70

65.
See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 44, at 274–75.
66.
California is the rare state that includes the concept of insane delusions directly
in its statutory code rather than as merely an interpretation of the general statutory “sound
mind” necessary for testation. CAL. PROB. CODE § 6100.5(a)(2) (1995) (declaring an
individual not mentally competent to make a will if “[t]he individual suffers from a mental
disorder with symptoms including delusions or hallucinations, which delusions or
hallucinations result in the individual’s devising property in a way which, except for the
existence of the delusions or hallucinations, the individual would not have done”).
67.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 8.1 cmt. s (AM. LAW INST. 2003).
68.
DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 44, at 275. In the majority of jurisdictions,
a run-of-the-mill testator’s mistake will not be corrected, although both the Restatement and
Uniform Probate Code permit reformation if there is clear and convincing evidence that the
terms of the will run counter to the testator’s intent. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.:
WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 12.1 (AM. LAW INST. 2003); UNIF. PROBATE CODE
§ 2-805 (amended 2010); Hirsch, supra note 63, at 315–18 (discussing various jurisdictions’
approaches to mistakes in wills).
69.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 8.1 cmt. s (AM. LAW INST. 2003).
70.
E.g., DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 44, at 275. To borrow one court’s
colorful illustration:
It would thus not be sufficient, to avoid a will, to show that the testator
believed that the moon was made of green cheese, but if it should be
established, in addition thereto, that because of this belief he devised or
bequeathed his property in a way which, saving for the belief, he would
not have done, a case is presented where the abnormality of mind has a
direct influence upon the testamentary act.
Hartung v. Homes (In re Chevallier’s Estate), 113 P. 130, 133 (Cal. 1911).
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A. Devises Premised on Delusions Regarding Familial Relationships
Typically, an insane delusion involves a false belief about a member of a
person’s family.71 A testator might be delusionally committed to the belief that his
or her spouse was unfaithful.72 Or to the belief that he did not father his children.73
Or to the belief that her heir or caretaker was attempting to poison or otherwise harm
her.74 Thus, the testator might seek to disinherit a child or spouse based on such
delusions. Such beliefs—about relations within particular families—do not interest
society at large.
A primary concern behind these cases is that the testator has selected
among the natural objects of her bounty based on a false belief that is the product of
mental illness. The results can lead to patently inequitable distributions—
prioritizing certain close relatives over others for reasons not grounded in reality.
The unfairness may be especially acute when the snubbed family member provided
care to the decedent.75 Although these fact patterns occupy the heartland of insane
delusion cases, they are not this Article’s focus. Rather, this Article focuses on the
disquieting hinterland of insane-delusion jurisprudence.
B. Devises Seeking to Advance “Peculiar” Beliefs
In an unsettling body of case law, courts have applied the doctrine of insane
delusions to testators’ attempts to advance beliefs or sets of beliefs. These beliefs
are not of the intra-family-drama variety, for which society has no prevalent
viewpoint.76 Rather, the beliefs that get called into question as delusional are beliefs
that run counter to prevailing views of the time.
The textbook example (literally taken from the leading textbook) of
labeling a counter-majoritarian belief as an “insane delusion” is In re Strittmater’s
Estate, a 1947 decision of the Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey (the
71.
DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 44, at 275; see, e.g., In re Dankbar,
430 N.W.2d 124, 130 (Iowa 1988) (testator held a “fixed, false belief that her father was an
alcoholic who emotionally abused her as a child and ultimately ruined her life”).
72.
See Joshua Tate, Personal Reality: Delusion in Law and Science, 49 CONN. L.
REV. 891, 906–10 (2017) (summarizing cases); Bradley E.S. Fogel, The Completely Insane
Law of Partial Insanity: The Impact of Monomania on Testamentary Capacity, 42 REAL PROP.
PROB. & TR. J. 67, 88–89, 95 (2007) (summarizing cases).
73.
See Tate, supra note 72, at 906–09 (summarizing cases).
74.
See id. at 922–23 (describing M.I. Marshall & Isley Tr. Co. of Ariz. v.
McCannon (In re Killen), 937 P.2d 1368 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996)); Fogel, supra note 72,
at 102–03 (same).
75.
For instance, in Killen, the testator suffered from delusions that three of her
four nieces and nephews were attempting to harm her by sprinkling parasites and chemicals
on her from above. 937 P.2d at 1370. The record reflected that those same nieces and nephews
actually cared for the testator. Id. In her will, the testator left the majority of her estate to the
nephew about whom she had no delusions and a dollar apiece to the other three. Id. at 1369.
The appellate court affirmed the invalidation of the will because the testator’s “insane
delusions focused on natural objects of her bounty and thus materially affected her disposition
of her property.” Id. at 1374.
76.
Society lacks an opinion on whether Uncle Henry was faithful to Aunt Sally
or whether Billy was actually fathered by the mailman.
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predecessor to the current state supreme court).77 The will of Louisa Strittmater left
her estate to the National Woman’s Party.78 Her only living relatives were some
cousins whom she rarely saw.79 The trial court set aside the devise as an insane
delusion, finding that it was the product of an “insane hatred” of men.80 According
to the court, Strittmater suffered from “feminism to a neurotic extreme” and
harbored a “morbid aversion to men” that included “look[ing] forward to the day
when women would bear children without the aid of men, and all males would be
put to death at birth.”81 The high court of New Jersey affirmed the finding that the
devise was the product of an insane delusion, and thus the estate was distributed to
Strittmater’s cousins instead.82
To summarize: Strittmater was a woman in a legal era dominated by men.
Her “delusion” was simply that she did not like men very much, and that belief
caused her to leave her estate to an organization devoted to advancing women. This
action does not seem particularly objectionable, especially when viewed through the
lens of using the law of wills to effectuate the decedent’s intent. Instead,
Strittmater’s devise was likely invalidated because it offended the decision-makers
who evaluated it after her death.83 This type of bias furthers societal norms rather
than testamentary freedom.
Another troublesome area is religion, especially when the testator’s
religious beliefs diverge from the mainstream faiths. The doctrine of insane
delusions is a hazard to fringe religious beliefs, even (or especially) when they are
truly and dearly held. This result is especially troubling given the common mantra
that religious beliefs are irrelevant as evidence of mental capacity to make a will.84
77.
In re Strittmater’s Estate, 53 A.2d 205 (N.J. 1947), reproduced in part in
DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 44, at 275–77.
78.
Strittmater’s Estate, 53 A.2d at 205.
79.
Id.
80.
Id. at 205–06.
81.
Id. at 205.
82.
Id. at 206.
83.
For those bothered by the court’s ill treatment of the Strittmater testator’s dim
view of men, a somewhat satisfying corollary may be found in Joslyn v. Sedam, 7 Ohio Dec.
Reprint 350 (Ohio Dist. Ct. 1877). The Joslyn testator harbored a delusion that all women
were prostitutes and could support themselves “out of the wages of sin.” Id. at 353. As a
result, he left a disproportionately large amount of his estate to his son rather than his two
daughters who, like all women, he believed to be prostitutes. Id. The will was set aside based
on a finding that the testator was laboring under both mental incapacity and the undue
influence of his son. As a result, the three children inherited the estate in equal shares. Id. at
350–51.
84.
See, e.g., Belz v. Piepenbrink, 149 N.E. 483, 485 (Ill. 1925) (“The belief of a
person upon religious or political questions cannot be made a test of his sanity.”); Nalty’s
Adm’r v. Franzman’s Ex’r, 299 S.W. 585, 585 (Ky. Ct. App. 1927) (“A belief in the doctrines
of Mohammed, Confucius, Zoroaster, or any other doctrine or religion, may not be offered as
evidence on the question of testamentary capacity.”). But see Davis’ Ex’r v. Laughlin,
133 S.W.2d 544, 546 (Ky. Ct. App. 1939) (stating that evidence that testator had embraced
Catholicism in the final months of her life after a lifetime of great antipathy toward Catholics
was competent evidence of lack of mental capacity to make a will).
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It is generally quite easy for a court to find that religious beliefs do not bear
on mental capacity when the will is not influenced by those beliefs.85 After all, a
devise must be the product of an insane delusion for the doctrine to invalidate it.86
But when particular devises are premised on religious beliefs, testators risk
offending the decision-makers’ sensibilities and prompting the invalidation of the
religiously motivated devise.
An insane delusion must, by definition, be an erroneous belief. Thus, the
soundest approach for courts to take when considering religious beliefs is simply to
confess that “[t]he truth or falsity of a religious belief is beyond the scope of a
judicial inquiry.”87 There is, quite literally, “no test (known to men) by which it can
be tried and its truth or falsity demonstrated.”88
85.
See, e.g., Buchanan v. Pierie, 54 A. 583, 585 (Pa. 1903) (“[W]hile the testator
held firmly to the conviction that he could, through mediums, communicate with the spirits
of the departed, and particularly with the spirit of his dead son, yet it does not appear that he
believed or ever admitted that he was influenced in any way by the spirits in the preparation
of his will.”); In re Randall, 59 A. 552, 553 (Me. 1904) (“Some persons believe they have
communications from and interviews with the spirits of deceased persons. This may be a
delusion, and is so regarded by many; but, unless such supposed communications control the
disposition of property, the believer in them is not thereby rendered incompetent to make a
valid will.”).
86.
See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
87.
In re Brush’s Will, 72 N.Y.S. 421, 425 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 1901) (finding that a
testator’s devise of the bulk of her estate to a Christian Science church was not the product of
an insane delusion); see also Scott v. Scott, 72 N.E. 708, 710 (Ill. 1904) (overturning jury’s
invalidation of a will that contained devises designed to advance the writings of Emanuel
Swedenborg: “[A] belief in Swedenborgianism, and enthusiasm manifested in propagating
that faith, furnish no evidence of monomania, insane delusion, or insanity.”).
88.
In re Elston’s Estate, 262 P.2d 148, 150 (Okla. 1953) (“[N]o creed or religious
belief, in so far as it pertains to an existence after death, can be regarded as a delusion . . . . ”).
As the Supreme Court of Tennessee put it:
We can comprehend the delusion of the man who fancied he was Jesus
Christ, and kindly extended his forgiveness when asked, saying, I am the
Christ; also his, who imagined he corresponded with a princess in cherry
juice, who dreamed dreams, and heard voices directing him to burn York
Minster church. But we can not comprehend a delusion upon a point of
belief as to the nature of future rewards and punishments [in the afterlife],
and the principles of justice upon which they will be distributed. This is a
subject beyond the ken of mortal man, and in one sense of the word,
perhaps, every individual is laboring under a delusion who attempts to
solve it. Yet there is no subject we are more disposed to theorize about,
and about which there is no greater conflict of opinion. The fool hath said
in his heart there is no God; and of course no future rewards and
punishments [in the afterlife]; a dreadful error, yet no one apprehends that
it amounts to insanity, and that he has not a disposing mind [sufficient to
make a will]. The Turk looks to his heaven of sensual enjoyment, the
Christian to his intellectual points of faith, differing as widely as the
sources of their religion. Delusion in its legal sense can not be predicated
of either, and indeed of no creed upon the subject, because there is no test
by which it can be tried.
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Other courts are not so open-minded about religious beliefs. A devise
premised on a nonmainstream religious belief can lead to its invalidation.89
Believers in Spiritualism—communications with the dead—once faced particular
hostility from the decision-makers. Devises have been invalidated for establishing
Spiritualist churches and libraries,90 for founding a home for poor and aged
mediums,91 and for the benefit of “spiritualist work” by the National Spiritualists’
Association of the United States.92 Courts have gone as far as to say that any will
that is the product of a belief in Spiritualism is invalid.93
The Supreme Court of Washington offered its views on devises based on
“peculiar” religious beliefs in the case of Ingersoll v. Gourley:
[W]hile testamentary capacity is not to be measured by religious
belief or opinions, yet if these opinions are of a nature which
produces a will which is wholly the result of them, in other words,
if the will in question would not have been made if the testator
Gass’ Heirs v. Gass’ Ex’rs, 22 Tenn. (3 Hum.) 278, 284 (1842) (emphasis added).
89.
As one court stated:
A man may be insane about his religion, as well as about any other subject.
If he believes and practices things in connection with a religion which he
accepts and to which a substantial number of people adhere, which things
are contrary to the experiences of normal human life, and contrary to the
practices and beliefs of such religion, such beliefs and practice may be
shown as proof of mental incapacity. Insane delusions may, and do, exist
about religion, and it would be unsound to hold that, if a man was mentally
unbalanced about his religion, such mental state, and his acts, words, and
conduct flowing therefrom, might not be proven as evidence on the
question of his testamentary capacity. There is a clear distinction between
a religious belief and insane delusions.
Nalty’s Adm’r v. Franzman’s Ex’r, 299 S.W. 585, 585–86 (Ky. Ct. App. 1927).
90.
Owen v. Crumbaugh, 81 N.E. 1044, 1055–56 (Ill. 1907) (reversing jury’s
finding that testator lacked testamentary capacity where will devised bulk of estate to establish
a Spiritualist church and library).
91.
O’Dell v. Goff, 112 N.W. 736, 738 (Mich. 1907) (finding that evidence
supported jury’s finding that testator’s “mind dwelt upon the subject of Spiritualism so
persistently and profoundly as to make him incapable of reasoning” and thus either lacking
in mental capacity to make a will or subject to undue influence from spiritualistic
communications, where testator devised bulk of estate for the purpose of founding, building,
and equipping a home for poor and aged spiritual mediums).
92.
Irwin v. Lattin, 135 N.W. 759, 763 (S.D. 1912) (affirming trial court’s denial
of probate based on a finding that “testatrix was possessed of the belief that she had frequent
and continual communication with departed spirits . . . and that she had been directed by said
spirits to give and bequeath all her property to the Spiritualists’ Association”).
93.
In re Rohe’s Will, 50 N.Y.S. 392, 395 (Sur. Ct. 1898) (“The will of one who
believes in Spiritism is not on that account void, nor is it evidence of mental unsoundness. It
must be shown, in order to avoid a will on that account, that it was the offspring of such
belief.”); see also Compton v. Smith, 150 S.W.2d 657, 660 (Ky. Ct. App. 1941) (“[I]t is
likewise true that a normal belief in spiritualism is not evidence of insanity, unless such belief
is possessed to the extent that it destroys the will power and overcomes it or indulged in to
such an extent as to indicate insane delusions.” (internal citation omitted)).
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had not entertained some peculiar religious belief, his
testamentary capacity may well be doubted.94
The Ingersoll testator bequeathed half of his estate to Thomas Gourley to be held
“in trust for the benefit and use of widows, orphans, and deserving poor.”95 Gourley
was the founder of a religious sect known as the Saints of the Lord, which was
“peculiar” in the eyes of the court.96 As a result, the court invalidated the devise,
finding that the testator was “the victim of a morbid and insane delusion as to the
power, and mission of Gourley, believing him to be possessed of superhuman
attributes and powers and charged with a mission beyond that committed to ordinary
men . . . .”97 In doing so, the court implicitly ruled that the testator’s religious belief
was erroneous. Such treatment appears to be reserved only for religious beliefs that
are deemed to be “peculiar.”

III. TWO IDEAS FOR REFORM
Our society professes to prize testamentary freedom, but our courts rankle
at actually carrying out this freedom when faced with bequests that run counter to
societal preferences. This Part lays out two proposed reforms, the first of which
focuses on the threat of applying the doctrine of insane delusions to devises that seek
to advance unpopular viewpoints. The proposed reform is simply to shrink the
doctrine and refrain from applying it to this category of devises.
The second proposal addresses the greater challenge of aligning estate
administration generally with the latent societal preference that decedents pass
wealth to their families. Currently, this norm rears its head on an ad hoc basis when
courts and juries manipulate flexible doctrines to invalidate devises with which they
disagree. The second proposal suggests that it may be more straightforward to
simply recognize expressly that inheritance by family is an important societal norm
and require that decedents leave some share of their estates to family members.
Doing so would pay tribute to the norm of familial support and potentially make
judges and juries less likely to invalidate devises to nonfamily members. Although
testators would be denied freedom over a portion of their estates, that restriction may
actually result in greater overall testamentary freedom in the form of less meddling
by judges and juries. These proposals are not mutually exclusive—courts could
implement the former, and legislatures could implement the latter.
A. Refrain from Applying Insane Delusions to Devises that Seek to Advance
Beliefs
The doctrine of insane delusions simply should not be applied to devises
that seek to advance particular beliefs. These devises are distinct from the mine-run
insane-delusion cases in which testators suffer from delusions that affect their
relationships with the natural objects of their bounties. Moreover, the threat of
94.
Ingersoll v. Gourley, 139 P. 207, 209 (Wash. 1914).
95.
Id. at 208.
96.
Id. Among other tenets, the Saints of the Lord apparently believed that Gourley
could work miracles and was a steward sent by God to distribute his followers’ property to
the poor. Id.
97.
Id. at 209.
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judges and juries importing their own subjective viewpoints and cultural norms is
especially acute when testators seek to advance a fringe belief.98
A court should not place itself in the role of arbiter of truths, particularly
when the disputed issue is one of belief. What one person regards as a “truth” another
may consider an opinion or belief. There are many deeply held beliefs that are not
uniformly held by all members of society. Whether these beliefs constitute truths or
delusions should not be the province of courts. Many would think that denial of
climate change or evolution is delusional given the scientific evidence to the
contrary. Or that subscription to particular political or economic theories is
delusional. But should a devise to an organization that champions these beliefs be
invalidated as an insane delusion? If so, then testators only possess testamentary
freedom to the extent that their views are noncontrarian.
As a hypothetical, take the professed beliefs of Kyrie Irving, an all-star in
the National Basketball Association.99 He believes—or at least has professed to
believe—that the Earth is flat.100 Assume for sake of this hypothetical that it is a
deeply held belief that he clings to beyond all evidence to the contrary, and it causes
him to devise a portion of his estate to the Flat Earth Society.101 Should that devise

98.
See supra Section II.B.
99.
Irving, who was educated at Duke University, is a member of the Boston
Celtics. As a member of the Cleveland Cavaliers, he scored the winning shot in game seven
of the 2016 NBA Finals. See BRIAN WINDHORST & DAVE MCMENAMIN, RETURN OF THE KING:
LEBRON JAMES, THE CLEVELAND CAVALIERS AND THE GREATEST COMEBACK IN NBA HISTORY
237–38 (2017).
100.
Irving first publicly espoused this belief during a podcast interview with his
former teammates, Richard Jefferson and Channing Frye. Road Trippin’ with RJ & Channing:
Episode 7: Kyrie Irving – DEEP in thought 30,000 Feet High Above, YOUTUBE (Feb. 17,
2017) at 15:43, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mzjL9JxSFAk. There has been some
speculation that Irving’s statements were meant to be a commentary on the media or a call
for people to challenge deeply ingrained beliefs rather than a reflection of his actual beliefs
on the Earth’s lack of roundness. See, e.g., NBA Commissioner Adam Silver Has Fun with
Kyrie Irving’s Flat-Earth Comments at All-Star Press Conference (Feb. 18, 2017), available
at
http://www.nba.com/article/2017/02/18/commissioner-adam-silver-all-star-pressconference (quoting NBA Commissioner Adam Silver as saying that Irving “was trying to be
provocative and I think it was effective”). It has been reported that Irving’s statements
contributed to a recent wave of flat-Earth believers among U.S. middle-school students. See
Avi Wolfman-Arent, The Ongoing Battle Between Science Teachers and Fake News, NPR
(July 28, 2017, 6:06 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/ed/2017/07/28/537907951/theongoing-battle-between-science-teachers-and-fake-news; Matt Bonesteel, Kyrie Irving’s
Flat-Earth Beliefs Now the Bane of Middle-School Teachers, WASH. POST (July 28, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/early-lead/wp/2017/07/28/kyrie-irvings-flat-earthbeliefs-now-the-bane-of-middle-school-teachers.
101.
See generally THE FLAT EARTH SOC’Y, https://www.tfes.org/ (last visited Aug.
2, 2017); see also Press Release, The Flat Earth Society, The Flat Earth Society Officially
Reopens
to
New
Members
(Oct.
30,
2009),
http://www.theflatearthsociety.org/library/pressreleases/flat_earth_society_press_release.pd
f.
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be invalidated as the product of an insane delusion?102 If he did the same thing in
the year 1491, the answer would assuredly be no, as a flat Earth was the prevailing
belief at the time. But today, the prevailing belief in society is that the Earth is not
flat, and the outcome could very well be the invalidation of the devise.
Some people follow the Harry Potter books as religious texts.103 Others
find religious guidance in the Bible. Qualitatively, there is little to separate the two
as religious texts: both books describe events that are fantastical, given the daily
experiences of millions of humans. The only meaningful difference is the number
of followers. It is not hard to imagine, however, that a court or jury would be much
quicker to deem a literal belief in Harry Potter’s struggles with Voldemort to be an
insane delusion than it would be to deem a literal belief in Noah’s experiences with
the flood. This outcome—labeling a belief in Hermione Granger as delusional but a
belief in a wooden ship full of animals as beyond the reach of judicial inquiry—is
not based on anything other than majoritarian preferences and biases against
“peculiar” beliefs.104
Hostility toward “peculiar” beliefs has been well documented in other areas
of estate administration. Indeed, biases are bound to emerge whenever judgment is
involved.105 Decision-makers are constantly tempted to review the equity of a
testator’s distributions and reform them to align with the decision-maker’s own
notions of fairness and appropriate behavior.106 This temptation may reflect the
102.
This is a pure hypothetical. The Author has no knowledge of Irving’s intended
estate plan.
103.
HARRY
POTTER
AND
THE
SACRED
TEXT,
http://www.harrypottersacredtext.com/ (last visited Aug. 3, 2017); see also Cristela Guerra,
Could ‘Harry Potter’ Give Rise to a New Religion?, BOS. GLOBE (Sept. 22, 2016),
https://www.bostonglobe.com/lifestyle/2016/09/22/could-harry-potter-give-rise-newreligion/WIAWQ431SNS2E8KFNlOaiP/story.html.
104.
The same could be said for the followers of Jediism, a faith grounded in the
Star Wars franchise. See, e.g., Tim Donnelly, Thousands of people have converted to the Jedi
faith, N.Y. POST (Dec. 14, 2015), https://nypost.com/2015/12/14/the-jedi-faith-is-very-realand-its-surging-in-popularity/; Tom de Castella, Have Jedi Created a New ‘Religion’?, BBC
NEWS MAG. (Oct. 25, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-29753530.
105.
See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 696 (8th ed.
2011) (“There is no doubt a paternalistic streak in decisions by courts to disregard the terms
in a will.”); Jane B. Baron, Empathy, Subjectivity, and Testamentary Capacity, 24 SAN DIEGO
L. REV. 1043, 1043 (1987) (“[I]f values are truly individual, empathy is problematic: the best
faith attempts to understand another person may fail—indeed, they are probably doomed to
fail. In such instances, we are left to impose our wishes and values on the testator instead of
effectuating the testator’s own desires.”).
106.
See Sitkoff, supra note 1, at 649 (“Judges and juries may be tempted to find
undue influence or incapacity if the testator’s dispositions seem unfair or unnatural.”). Note
that a different set of considerations is at play when a group’s mission is itself illegal. In that
situation, the invalidity of the bequest stems not just from a philosophical disagreement
between the testator and the decision-maker, but from an actual tension between the stated
policy objective of the group and the stated policy of the government as expressed in the
criminal law. See McCorkill v. McCorkill Estate, 2014 N.B.R. 2d 148 (N.B. Ct. of Queen’s
Bench 2014) (voiding a devise to a neo-Nazi group because the documented objectives and
activities of the group were illegal and violative of public policy).
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belief that the often-elderly individuals who make wills lack sound judgment107 or
simply a recognition that the testator is no longer around to make a fuss. In the words
of the Supreme Court of Illinois, “It is a constantly recurring source of error in will
cases that there is a strong inclination in courts, and especially in juries, to do by
their judgments or verdicts what they would have advised, had the testator consulted
them beforehand.”108
Thus, there is at least a serious tension—and at most an all-out conflict—
between the theoretical underpinning of testamentary freedom and the practical
administration of decision-makers bending pliable doctrines to effectuate their own
preferred outcomes at the expense of the testator’s expressed preferences. Certain
doctrines profess to facilitate testamentary freedom, but in operation, they can be
used to frustrate it. In particular, the doctrines of undue influence, testamentary
incapacity, and fraud have been identified as prone to abuse.109 Undue influence, in
particular, has been singled out as a particularly effective tool for assisting decisionmakers in reforming decedents’ estate plans.110
Commentators have forcefully noted that such abuse is generally reserved
for devises that break from social norms.111 This poses a challenge to the entire
premise of testamentary freedom: if testators are only “free” to arrange their estate
plans in ways that conform to societal norms, then testators lack actual freedom.
They only possess the appearance of freedom. But because most testators devise
their estate plans in ways that align with societal norms, the lack of true freedom
goes unrecognized.
The true test of freedom, of course, occurs when its possessor attempts to
exercise it by going against the grain.112 Testators who attempt to disregard their
families and distribute their estates to nonfamily members risk invalidation,
especially when the testators’ relationships with the recipients run counter to societal
107.
See POSNER, supra note 105, at 696 (noting that “a person’s will is often made
while he is quite elderly [when] his judgment may not be as sound as it was when he was
younger”).
108.
Owen v. Crumbaugh, 81 N.E. 1044, 1055 (Ill. 1907). Similarly, another court
reversed a jury’s determination in a will contest:
The verdict in this case can not be accounted for on any theory other than
prejudice of the jury. The modern tendencies of juries in will contests is
to be governed by their own notions as to what the will should be, and
how the testator, according to their individual notions, should have
disposed of his property. . . . The only theory upon which the verdict can
be accounted for was the bias and prejudice of the jury.
Bd. of Foreign Missions of Presbyterian Church v. Bevan, 24 Ohio C.D. 318, 326 (Ct. App.
1913) (jury had invalidated testator’s will where it devised a portion of his estate to the Board
of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church rather than to his wife and son).
109.
See infra note 120 and accompanying text.
110.
See infra note 137 and accompanying text.
111.
See infra notes 116–17 and accompanying text.
112.
See Carla Spivack, Why the Testamentary Doctrine of Undue Influence Should
Be Abolished, 58 KAN. L. REV. 245, 249 (2010) (“The principle of testamentary freedom is
not necessary to protect conventional bequests that conform to general experience; rather, it
exists to carry out devises that fail to conform to social norms yet reflect the testator’s will.”).
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norms.113 For example, certain decision-makers have shown discomfort with devises
to same-sex partners or much-younger companions.114
Numerous doctrines that govern testation are flexible by design to
accommodate the wide range of potential factual scenarios that may arise.115
Flexible doctrines, however, are prone to manipulation.116 When distributing
testators’ estates, judges and juries are more likely to validate a will or a devise if it
conforms with societal norms and expectations regarding distributing assets to close
family members.117
In her seminal work, The Myth of Testamentary Freedom, Professor
Melanie Leslie concluded that “testamentary freedom exists for the vast majority of
testators who happen to have the same sense of duty and moral obligation that the
law implicitly imposes—but often not for those who hold non-conforming
values.”118 Later works have built upon Leslie’s observations and contributed further
evidence that majoritarian preferences often dictate testamentary outcomes at the
expense of the testator’s expressed preferences.119 In sum, a devise to a nonfamily
member is more likely to be invalidated as the product of undue influence,
testamentary incapacity, or fraud than a similar devise to a family member.120
113.
Irene D. Johnson, There’s a Will, But No Way—Whatever Happened to the
Doctrine of Testamentary Freedom and What Can (Should) We Do to Restore It?, 4 EST.
PLAN. & CMTY. PROP. L.J. 105, 108–09 (2011) (“Courts and juries seem loathe to uphold plans
that do not dispose of the leftover property to ‘the natural objects of the testator’s bounty’—
the testator’s closest family members.”).
114.
See Spivack, supra note 112, at 276–86 (summarizing cases that betrayed the
decision-maker’s ideological disapproval of the testator’s relationships); Ray D. Madoff,
Unmasking Undue Influence, 81 MINN. L. REV. 571, 592–600 (1997) (chronicling the case of
Weiss v. Kaufmann (In re Kaufmann’s Will), 247 N.Y.S.2d 664 (App. Div. 1964), aff’d 205
N.E.2d 864 (N.Y. 1965)).
115.
See Spivack, supra note 112, at 264.
116.
E. Gary Spitko, Gone But Not Conforming: Protecting the Abhorrent Testator
from Majoritarian Cultural Norms Through Minority-Culture Arbitration, 49 CASE W. RES.
L. REV. 275, 283 (1999) (labeling the doctrines of mental capacity and undue influence
“sufficiently nebulous that they allow the fact-finder to rewrite the testator’s estate plan in
accordance with societal norms”).
117.
Id. at 282 (“The ‘abhorrent’ testator who disinherits her legal spouse or close
blood relations in favor of, for example, a non-mainstream religion, a radical political
organization, or a same-sex romantic partner is especially at risk of having her estate plan
discarded.”).
118.
Leslie, supra note 48, at 237.
119.
See Madoff, supra note 114; Spitko, supra note 116.
120.
See Leslie, supra note 48, at 236–37 (“[C]ourts faced with an offensive will
often use other doctrines ostensibly designed to ascertain whether the testator formulated
testamentary intent—doctrines such as capacity, undue influence and fraud—to frustrate the
testator’s intent and distribute estate assets to family members.”); Leslie, supra note 48, at
243–58 (exposing how the doctrine of undue influence is manipulated to promote family
protection and “just results” in the eyes of the decision-maker); Spitko, supra note 116, at 280
(“[A]ll things being equal, a testamentary disposition favoring family is more likely to survive
a capacity, undue influence or fraud challenge than is a disposition favoring non-family.”);
Johnson, supra note 113, at 106 (“[T]estamentary plans that conform to social norms, such as
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Likewise, an instrument is more likely to be found noncompliant with the requisite
formalities for making a valid will when it contains bequests that deviate from
societal norms.121
Invalidating these devises—or the wills that contain them—often results in
a family member being substituted as the beneficiary. After devises of specific
property in a will are carried out, a residuary devise conveys the remainder of the
testator’s estate.122 Thus, if a particular devise fails, the property falls into the residue
and is distributed to the beneficiary of the residuary devise.123 That beneficiary is
often a close family member.124 If there is no residuary devise, or if the residuary
devise or the entire will is invalidated, the affected property falls into intestacy and
is practically guaranteed to be distributed to a family member.125 In one example, a
will that sought to devise the estate in equal parts to three religious organizations
was invalidated for lack of mental capacity because the testator was found to suffer
from delusions that “manifested themselves chiefly as religious fanaticism.”126 The
result was that the estate was distributed, instead, to the decedent’s heirs-in-law.127
Given decision-makers’ demonstrated preference for inheritance by family
members, Professor Irene Johnson called freedom of testation “a thing of smoke and
mirrors, lulling testators into a false sense of security about their testamentary
plans”128 and observed that “[o]ne begins to wonder why [an individual] should
write a will at all” given that the results often feel preordained.129 All too often it
seems that the decision-maker will find one way or another to arrive at the same
destination—distributing the decedent’s estate to the family.
The doctrine of insane delusions simply provides judges and juries with
another tool to impose their own views on testamentary outcomes, and this menace
is particularly grave when it comes to devises that seek to advance peculiar beliefs.
providing for members of the decedent’s family, are likely to be upheld; while wills that seek
to dispose of property in a less conventional manner are often defeated on various
grounds. . . .”).
121.
See Leslie, supra note 48, at 258–68. In general, a will must be in writing,
signed by the testator, and either witnessed by at least two individuals or acknowledged by
the testator before a notary public. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-502(a) (amended 2010). But see
id. § 2-502(b) (permitting unwitnessed, holographic wills that are written in the hand of the
testator).
122.
See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 44, at 374 (providing the following
example of a residuary devise: “a devise to A of ‘all of the rest, residue, and remainder of my
property and estate’”).
123.
See id. at 351; UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-604(a) (amended 2010).
124.
See MARVIN B. SUSSMAN, JUDITH N. CATES & DAVID T. SMITH, THE FAMILY
AND INHERITANCE 83-120 (1970) (reporting results of empirical study in which testators
overwhelmingly left devises to family members); see also DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note
44, at 65.
125.
See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 44, at 351–52. Intestacy is described
infra in Subsection III.B.1.
126.
Hankins v. Mabee (In re Murray’s Estate), 144 P.2d 1016, 1022 (Or. 1944).
127.
Id. at 1017, 1023.
128.
Johnson, supra note 113, at 106.
129.
Id. at 109.
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Decision-makers often have their own opinions and beliefs on these same topics,
and the law should not tempt them with the opportunity to prioritize their own beliefs
over those of the testator. If freedom of testation is the organizing principle, it should
be a principle that is borne out in how estates are actually administrated on a daily
basis.
Society at large (or testators’ families) may deem it “wasteful” for testators
to spend their estates on advancing viewpoints that are believed to be
wrongheaded.130 However, there are meaningful differences between spending
money to advance the theory that the Earth is flat and flushing the money down the
toilet. Assets that are burned, buried, or drowned no longer contribute to society.
Razing a house diminishes property value.131 Transferring the house to the Flat Earth
Society so that it can be sold to generate funds to support flat-Earth messaging does
not diminish property value. It simply passes the asset through the organization.
Society is economically no worse off—all that has been generated is some
propaganda that champions counter-majoritarian ideas.132

130.
The dead hand, for all of its supposed freedoms, lacks the power to destroy.
See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Destroy, 114 YALE L.J. 781, 838 (2005) (“As a
general matter, the law recoils at the idea of allowing the dead hand to destroy property.”);
see also John H. Langbein, Burn the Rembrandt? Trust Law’s Limits on the Settlor’s Power
to Direct Investments, 90 B.U. L. REV. 375, 376 n.8 (2010) (collecting cases). As such, the
living and the dead hand are treated unabashedly unequally:
This is not a living person who seeks to exercise a right to reshape or
dispose of her property; instead, it is an attempt by will to confer the power
to destroy upon an executor who is given no other interest in the property.
To allow an executor to exercise such power stemming from apparent
whim and caprice of the testatrix contravenes public policy.
Eyerman v. Mercantile Tr. Co., 524 S.W.2d 210, 214 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975). Surely many
decedents are buried with some of their personal effects, and some even in their automobiles.
See MADOFF, supra note 51, at 14 & 158 n.4 (describing decedents whose requests to be
buried in their cars were followed); see also Noam Kutler, Note, Protecting Your Online You:
A New Approach to Handling Your Online Persona After Death, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
1641, 1663 (2011). But this practice is best viewed as an acquiescence by the living rather
than a power of the dead.
The primary justification for this approach is that testators should not have the
power to destroy property when they will not suffer the economic consequences of its
destruction. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 47 cmt. E (AM. LAW INST. 2003)
(“Although one may deal capriciously with one’s own property, self-interest ordinarily
restrains such conduct.”); see also Strahilevitz, supra note 130, at 839–41 (describing and
criticizing this justification). This approach, of course, diminishes testamentary freedom in
that it limits what testators may do with their property at death. See Strahilevitz, supra, at
838–39 (“[T]he law’s resistance to dead hand destruction pushes against the grain of
American trusts and estates law, which is for the most part relatively deferential to the wishes
of testators and settlors regarding the disposition of their property.”).
131.
See Eyerman, 524 S.W.2d at 213 (finding that razing the house would reduce
the value of the property from $40,000 to $650 and depreciate neighbors’ property values by
approximately $10,000).
132.
A testator could certainly spend her wealth during her lifetime challenging
round-Earth beliefs. Taking away her ability to do so after death only incentivizes attempts
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Moreover, the anti-waste doctrine is narrow: it is best applied in situations
in which assets are literally destroyed. That is a fairly bright-line inquiry that leaves
very little room for judgment—and therefore little room for bias. Making a
qualitative judgment that a particular idea is so worthless that propagating it would
be “wasteful” is a qualitatively different type of decision. It puts the judge or jury in
the position of determining which ideas are worthwhile and which are not. This
dangerous proposition would further marginalize minority viewpoints.
Beliefs evolve. At one time it would have been thought wasteful or
delusional to spend money to advance the theory that microorganisms called germs
spread disease.133 At some point, medical science tipped the balance: germ theory
became the favored view, and its opponents were the erroneous ones.134 For the great
many of us, however, even such “proven facts” are taken as a matter of faith. I
believe that the world is round and microorganisms spread contagions, but I haven’t
independently verified those claims. My ancestors likely were equally assured of the
contrary perspective. The law of wills—a body of law organized around freedom of
testation—should not impose prevailing, contemporary views on all testators.
Rather, it should cast a big enough tent to accommodate devises that champion
causes or perspectives that are unpopular or uncomfortable to society at large.
Because the doctrine of insane delusions is not expressly written into
statutes,135 the reform need not be a legislative one. Instead, courts can—and
should—refuse to apply the doctrine to devises that seek to advance a particular set
of beliefs. Even in cases that do not involve such devises, courts should be mindful
about how they describe the doctrine. Appellate courts should not describe it so
broadly that it could be wielded in future cases as a tool to further majoritarian bias
and marginalize counter-majoritarian beliefs. A simple, clarifying comment should
be added to the Restatement to guide courts in this respect.
B. Further Unshackling the Dead Hand
In addition to the above suggestion targeted at the doctrine of insane
delusions, the law of wills needs broader reform to guard against decision-maker
bias. As explained above, it has long been observed that decision-makers manipulate
flexible doctrines to attain distributions that accord with the decision-makers’
preferences.136 This biased administration of estates undermines freedom of
testation.

to circumvent the probate process through inter vivos wealth transfers—for example, making
a large gift to the Flat Earth Society during life to ensure that it is not frustrated after death.
133.
See ROBERT P. GAYNES, GERM THEORY: MEDICAL PIONEERS IN INFECTIOUS
DISEASES 89–90, 159–61 (2011).
134.
See id. at 312 (“Despite infectious diseases claiming countless lives from
prehistoric times, the theory of ‘contagion’ due to living entities, i.e., the germ theory, is a
relatively recent one in the annals of Western medicine.”).
135.
See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
136.
See supra Section III.A.
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Commentators have urged that the doctrines most prone to abuse—like
undue influence—should simply be abolished.137 Indeed, I just urged the same thing
regarding a portion of the doctrine of insane delusions.138 However, the answer to
the overarching problem of decision-maker bias cannot be to simply abolish all of
the abused doctrines. Rather, it may be time for the law of wills to admit that freedom
of testation is not the whole deal and that society harbors a very powerful preference
for distributions to family. Acknowledging that norm allows for the law to expressly
account for it instead of pushing it to the sidelines for decision-makers to apply on
an ad hoc basis.
The discussion below sets forth a proposal for a “forced intestate share.”
The forced-intestate-share proposal extends and modifies the familiar concept of
providing an elective share for surviving spouses.139 In short, the forced intestate
share is simply setting aside a certain share of every estate that must be transferred
as though the decedent died intestate. It is a tribute to be paid to the decedent’s
family. By paying that tribute and satisfying the societal norm of familial support,
however, the decedent may be able to purchase something closer to true
testamentary freedom over the remainder of the estate. In other words, requiring
that, say, 20% of the estate must go to close family members may reduce the
likelihood that judges and juries will invalidate the other 80% of the estate plan
based on bias.
The following Subsections explain the intestate system, the elective share,
and how the two can be combined into a workable framework that safeguards
freedom of testation by acknowledging a societal preference for familial support.
1. Intestacy Explained
When a decedent dies intestate—without a will—the estate is distributed
according to the plan set forth in the state’s intestacy statute. An intestacy statute
creates an “estate plan by default” that seeks to effectuate the likely desired estate
plan of the typical intestate decedent.140 The intestate system is premised on
approximating freedom of distribution by attempting to construct the estate plan that
a typical decedent would have wanted, had she bothered to write it down.141
In an attempt to fulfill majoritarian preferences, intestacy statutes prioritize
distributions to close relatives and then, in the absence of surviving members at each

137.
See Spivack, supra note 112, at 245 (arguing that historical, doctrinal, and
psychological objections all warrant the abandonment of the doctrine of undue influence).
138.
See supra Section III.A.
139.
See infra Subsection III.B.2.
140.
DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 44, at 63.
141.
See Lawrence W. Waggoner, The Multiple-Marriage Society and Spousal
Rights Under the Revised Uniform Probate Code, 76 IOWA L. REV. 223, 230 (1991) (“Various
considerations drive the formulation of intestate-succession laws. The most obvious and
perhaps predominant consideration is the decedent’s intention. Of course, the law gives effect
to intention by imputation.”).
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layer of distribution, expand out to distributions to more distant relatives.142 For
example, a surviving spouse will always take a significant portion of an estate—and
oftentimes, the entire estate—through intestacy.143 In the absence of a surviving
spouse, surviving descendants inherit the estate.144 If the decedent leaves no
surviving spouse or descendants, the decedent’s parents will inherit the estate.145
And so forth and so on. The intricate web of intestacy law spirals out—through
spouses, descendants, ancestors, and collateral kin—until it reaches the point at
which the likely preferences of the typical intestate decedent can no longer be
presumed.146 That outer limit of many intestacy statutes is the decedent’s
grandparents and their descendants.147
If the decedent was not survived by any relatives who are qualified to take
under the intestacy statute, then the decedent’s estate escheats to the state—meaning
that it is forfeited to the government.148 This final fallback position is not designed
to carry out the decedent’s likely intent—few decedents would be gratified by
watching their estates being turned over to the government149—but rather is
necessary to facilitate a workable intestacy system.150 Once the outer bounds of
distant relatives are surpassed, the estate simply has to go somewhere, and the

142.
UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-102, 2-103 (amended 2010); see Bennardo, supra
note 30, at 40–42 (summarizing order of intestate distributions under the Uniform Probate
Code).
143.
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-102(1) (amended 2010).
144.
Id. § 2-103(a)(1). But see id. § 2-102(3), (4) (providing a share of the intestate
estate to surviving descendants in certain circumstances in which the decedent also leaves a
surviving spouse).
145.
Id. § 2-103(a)(2).
146.
Inheritance by very distant relatives creates the situation of the laughing
heir—an inheritance that creates a pecuniary windfall for the heir but no accompanying grief.
See, e.g., In re MacCarthy’s Estate, 17 Pa. D & C.3d. 600, 614 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 1980)
(labeling potential laughing heirs as those relatives “who had so little interest in decedent and
so little contact with him that they did not concern themselves for many years as to whether
he was living or dead”); David F. Cavers, Change in the American Family and the “Laughing
Heir”, 20 IOWA L. REV. 203, 208 (1935) (defining a laughing heir as “succession by one who
is so loosely linked to his ancestor as to suffer no sense of bereavement at his loss . . . .”). But
see John V. Orth, “The Laughing Heir” What’s So Funny?, 48 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J.
321, 324 (2013) (pointing out that emotional reaction is not a prerequisite to inheritance).
147.
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-103(a)(4), (5) (amended 2010). Certain states extend
inheritance rights to more distant relatives or certain classes of nonrelatives. See Bennardo,
supra note 30, at 42 n.56 (listing statutes).
148.
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-105 (amended 2010). See generally John V. Orth,
Escheat: Is the State the Last Heir?, 13 GREEN BAG 2D 73 (2009).
149.
Orth, supra note 146, at 324.
150.
See David C. Auten, Note, Modern Rationales of Escheat, 112 U. PA. L. REV.
95, 96 (1963) (“[T]he best [rationale] is that no reasonable alternative disposition has been
proposed.”); Julia M. Melius, Note, Was South Dakota Deprived of $3.2 Million? Intestacy,
Escheat, and the Statutory Power to Disinherit in the Estate of Jetter, 44 S.D. L. REV. 49, 73
(1999) (“The state does not take by intestate succession as the last heir of the decedent, but
rather, because there are no heirs capable of taking.”).
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government—the ultimate benefactor of the public—is viewed as a sensible resting
place.151
2. The Elective Share Explained
Despite the principle of testamentary freedom, a testator may not totally
disinherit her spouse, no matter how clearly she manifests that intent. A surviving
spouse may always “elect” to renounce the portion left to her in the decedent’s will
and instead take a statutory share of the decedent’s estate.152 This statutory share is
known as the elective share.153 As formulated by the Uniform Probate Code, the
elective share recognizes both a partnership theory of marital-wealth accumulation
and a support obligation between spouses.154 The partnership theory presumes that
spouses intend to pool their fortunes on an equal basis and recognizes the
restitutionary entitlement of both spouses to an equal share of marital property.155
The support-obligation theory, on the other hand, recognizes that mutual duties of
spousal support should continue, in some form, after death.156
Two preliminary determinations are required to calculate the surviving
spouse’s elective share: the augmented estate and the marital-property portion.157
The augmented estate is meant to capture the couple’s combined assets.158 The
augmented estate is the sum of the following values: the value of the decedent’s net
probate estate, the value of the decedent’s nonprobate transfers (to both the surviving
spouse and to others),159 and the value of the surviving spouse’s net assets at the
time of the decedent’s death (including nonprobate transfers to others).160 The
marital-property portion is a scaled percentage based on the length of the marriage
that approximates the portion of the augmented estate that is attributable to the
151.
See Auten, supra note 150, at 116 (declaring that, lacking heirs, “the state is
the only reasonable taker”).
152.
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-202 (amended 2010).
153.
Id.
154.
See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-202 cmt. (amended 2010).
155.
UNIF. PROBATE CODE art. II, pt. 2 general cmt. at 71 (amended 2010). The
partnership theory of marriage is also known as the “marital-sharing theory.” Id.
156.
Id. at 79. A useful way to conceptualize the difference between the two
theories is to consider a very short marriage and a very long marriage. Under the partnership
theory, the surviving spouse of a very short marriage would be entitled to very little because
very little of the decedent’s wealth was accumulated during the marriage. See id. at 74. But
in the case of a very long marriage in which the couple’s wealth was mostly accumulated
during the course of the marriage, the partnership theory would support an entitlement by the
surviving spouse to a large portion of the decedent’s estate. See id. at 73–74. The supportobligation theory, on the other hand, makes no distinction between long and short marriages.
Id. at 80 (“In implementing a support rationale, the length of the marriage is quite
irrelevant.”). Rather, the support obligation exists equally between all spouses.
157.
See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-202(a) (amended 2010).
158.
Id. art. II, pt. 2 general cmt. at 75.
159.
Nonprobate transfers are distributions that are made outside of the probate
context, such as payments made through trusts, life insurance, and pay-on-death and
retirement accounts. See Sitkoff, supra note 1, at 654.
160.
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-203(a) (amended 2010); UNIF. PROBATE CODE art.
II, pt. 2 general cmt. at 75-76.
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marriage.161 At the low end of the scale, the marital-property portion of the
augmented estate is only 3% for marriages that lasted less than one year before the
decedent’s demise.162 At the high end, the marital-property portion is 100% of the
augmented estate for marriages of 15 years or more.163 Once the marital-property
portion of the augmented estate is identified, the elective share is simply half of that
amount.164
Setting the elective share at 50% of the value of the marital-property
portion of the augmented estate satisfies the partnership theory’s view of equal
entitlement to wealth accumulated during the marriage. In recognition of the support
obligation, the Uniform Probate Code also provides for a supplemental electiveshare amount, which is only activated when the surviving spouse’s assets and other
entitlements fall below a floor of $75,000.165 In this way, the Uniform Probate
Code’s approach to the elective share combines aspects of both the partnership and
support-obligation theories of marriage.
When a surviving spouse claims an elective share, the elective share is first
satisfied by amounts that pass to the surviving spouse under the will, through
intestacy, or through nonprobate transfers as well as by the marital-property portion
of the surviving spouse’s property and nonprobate transfers to others.166 If that
amount fails to fulfill the elective share, the surviving spouse may claim the
unsatisfied balance from the remainder of the decedent’s estate.167 Other devises and
nonprobate transfers are proportionately abated to satisfy the remainder of the
surviving spouse’s elective share.168
3. Purchasing Freedom Through the Forced Intestate Share
As chronicled above, devises that deviate from majoritarian cultural norms
are more likely to be invalidated than those that do not.169 The result is often to cast
the entire estate into the intestate system, which calls for it to be distributed to the
decedent’s closest surviving relatives.170 Alternatively, the invalidation of a single
devise (while upholding the rest of the will) results in the assets from that devise
falling into the residuary devise and, again, often passing to family.171

161.
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-203(b).
162.
Id. § 2-203(b) alt. A.
163.
Id.
164.
Id. § 2-202(a); see also id. art. II, pt. 2 gen. cmt. at 76. For example, consider
the death of a spouse after ten years of marriage with an augmented estate of $500,000. The
marital-property portion of the augmented estate for a marriage of that length is 60%
($300,000). Id. § 2-203(b) alt. A. The surviving spouse’s elective share would be half of this
amount ($150,000). Id. § 2-202(a).
165.
Id. § 2-202(b) & cmt.
166.
Id. § 2-209(a).
167.
Id. § 2-209(c).
168.
Id.
169.
See supra Section III.A.
170.
See supra notes 122–25 and accompanying text.
171.
If there is no residuary devise, the assets from the invalidated devise would
fall into intestacy. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
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Under the current system, the decision-maker faces a binary decision:
uphold a devise or invalidate it. There is no halfway option that allows for the
decision-maker to make a Solomonian-like decree to split the baby.172 A devise
cannot be reformed to conform partially to the decision-maker’s preferences and
partially to the testator’s preferences.173 A distribution that is viewed as inequitable
cannot be brought just a tad bit more in line with societal norms. It must either be
followed or disregarded.
Consider an unmarried testator who left the entirety of her estate to the Flat
Earth Society and nothing to her two children. Upon the testator’s death, the children
challenge the will. The judge or jury decision-maker, thinking it unfair that the
testator failed to provide for her family, may well be tempted to invalidate the devise
(or the entire will) on the basis of insane delusion or testamentary incapacity (or
fraud or undue influence or failure to conform with all of the formalities necessary
to make a valid will). The result of invalidation would be to cast the estate into
intestacy, thereby distributing it in equal portions to the decedent’s two children.174
This result is undeniably at odds with the testator’s expressed wishes. But carrying
out the devise to the Flat Earth Society is at odds with societal norms and,
assumedly, most decision-makers’ preferences. For the decision-maker, the stakes
172.
That is not so in every area of the law. For example, in criminal law, a jury
may decide to find a defendant guilty of a lesser-included offense as a compromise between
a finding of guilt on the most serious charge and an acquittal. See, e.g., State v. Porter,
639 So.2d 1137, 1144 (La. 1994) (“[T]he lesser verdicts which were returned indicated the
jury’s refusal to accept unconditionally the victim’s version of the events.”). This middle
pathway allows a jury to balance competing interests by partially nullifying and partially
sustaining the prosecution. Interestingly, this type of jury nullification is often viewed as
“antimajoritarian.” Stacey P. Eilbaum, Note, The Dual Face of the American Jury: The
Antiauthoritarian and Antimajoritarian Hero and Villain in American Law and Legal
Scholarship, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 711, 725 (2013) (“When courts directly address the issue
of jury nullification, they often describe the jury as an antimajoritarian institution, a rogue
minority of individuals who have usurped the power of the legislature by nullifying laws
enacted by an elected, representative body.”). In the criminal system, even more balancing
occurs during sentencing when the decision-maker exercises discretion in selecting a
punishment from within a statutory range. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) (requiring
the court to impose a sentence “sufficient, but not greater than necessary” to achieve the
enumerated goals of punishment).
173.
Although the decision-maker cannot strike a compromise, the parties can.
Settling an estate by agreement is an option, especially when the outcome is unclear. See, e.g.,
Lenoir Rhyne Coll. v. Thorne, 185 S.E.2d 303, 307 (N.C. Ct. App. 1971) (affirming trial
court’s approval of a settlement agreement because “a bona fide controversy existed as to
whether the holographic document being offered for probate was a valid codicil”). Indeed,
informal distribution by agreement may, in fact, be the most common method of distributing
decedents’ estates. Robert A. Stein & Ian G. Fierstein, The Demography of Probate
Administration, 15 U. BALT. L. REV. 54, 60 (1985) (finding empirically that “the percentage
of all decedents who leave estates that undergo administration proceedings is not high”); see
STEWART E. STERK, MELANIE B. LESLIE & JOEL C. DOBRIS, ESTATES AND TRUSTS 45 (4th ed.
2011) (“If the beneficiaries, however, were all content to divide Jane’s property informally
(presumably in accordance with the will), no formal legal action would be necessary.”).
174.
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-103(a)(1) (amended 2010).
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are all or nothing: either 100% honor the counter-majoritarian devise to the Flat
Earth Society or 100% invalidate it and replace it with an intestate distribution to
the decedent’s children. What if there was another way?
Forcing an intestate share may actually further testamentary freedom. In
the above scenario, the decision-maker may well invalidate the devise, and the
testator’s expressed preference would be totally frustrated. But what if the law
required the distribution of 20% of a decedent’s estate to whomever would take
through intestacy? In that scenario, 20% of the estate would be split among the
decedent’s children in equal shares. That may well satiate the decision-maker’s
notion of sufficient familial support. With that thirst quenched, the decision-maker
may be less likely to manipulate another doctrine to invalidate the devise to the Flat
Earth Society. Thus, with 20% of the estate going to close family, the decisionmaker may be willing to allow the other 80% to pass to the Flat Earth Society in
accordance with the testator’s expressed wishes. By taking away testamentary
freedom over 20% of the estate, the law could potentially better achieve actual
testamentary freedom over the remaining 80%.
The current system of testation in the United States professes to largely
ignore familial support as a goal, instead preferring to espouse testamentary freedom
as the organizing principle.175 But the biases of decision-makers have demonstrated
that familial support is a latent norm in our society’s approach to decedents’
estates.176 Instead of ignoring this norm, the law of testation could pay it its due—
not necessarily because familial support is good or right or just, but because it is
going to express itself in jury verdicts and judicial outcomes one way or another.
Currently, it expresses itself by manipulating flexible doctrines—like mental
incapacity, undue influence, and fraud—in order to invalidate nonconforming
devises in favor of distributions to close family members. This system of ad hoc
enforcement occurs in the shadows. To some degree, we have a family-maintenance
system177 already, but without the family-maintenance statute to authorize it. This
reality may be surprising to many, given the resistance routinely shown to familymaintenance systems in this country.178
175.
See supra Section I.A.
176.
See supra Section III.A.
177.
As explained above, a family-maintenance statute grants considerable
discretion to the decision-maker to reform the testator’s will to provide support for various
members of the testator’s family. See supra Section I.C.
178.
Granting a court the authority to override a testator’s expressed preferences
has been called “violat[ive of] our country’s professed belief in freedom of testation” and
self-determination. Kristine S. Knaplund, Grandparents Raising Grandchildren and the
Implications for Inheritance, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 16 (2006); see also Brashier, supra note 49,
at 132–33 (noting that “unguided and unprincipled use of judicial discretion can lead to . . .
arbitrary and unsatisfactory” results). Additionally, it has been noted that the familymaintenance system’s flexibility creates costs. See Mary Ann Glendon, Fixed Rules and
Discretion in Contemporary Family Law and Succession Law, 60 TULANE L. REV. 1165, 1189
(1986) (“Our American experience with discretionary distribution on divorce should make us
extremely wary of any system that would encourage a variety of friends and relatives to
challenge wills and permit a probate judge to rearrange estate plans.”); see also Frances H.
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A wiser approach may be to simply recognize that familial support is
important to our society and expressly account for it in our system of decedents’
estates.179 Thus, this Article proposes that a share of a testator’s estate be distributed
to the decedent’s intestate takers—the “forced intestate share.” Let’s say the
proposed forced intestate share is set at 20%, although that precise percentage is not
essential to the proposal.180 In the case of a will contest under the forced-intestateshare system, the court would first determine who would take the decedent’s estate
under the intestacy statute. Twenty percent of the estate would be required to be
distributed in accordance with the intestacy statute.181
Here is an example. Tonya dies and is survived by five siblings: Abraham,
Bethany, Caitlin, David, and Eleanor. Tonya has no spouse or children; thus, her
intestate takers are her siblings.182 If she had no will, each sibling would take 20%
of her estate. But Tonya does have a will. In her will, she leaves her estate in equal
25% shares to three of her siblings—Abraham, Bethany, Caitlin—and to her one
friend Francis. Her will makes no provision for David or Eleanor. Under the forcedintestate-share proposal, 20% of Tonya’s estate would have to be distributed in
accordance with the intestacy statute. Thus, each of her siblings would be guaranteed
a distribution of at least 4% of the estate. The court would need to reform the
distributions to meet the forced intestate shares to ensure that both David and
Eleanor received their 4% shares. To do so, it would proportionally reduce the four
devises in the will to meet the obligation. Thus, the shares to Abraham, Bethany,
Caitlin, and Francis would each be reduced by 2% to create the 4% shares for David
Foster, Linking Support and Inheritance: A New Model from China, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 1199,
1215 (summarizing predicted costs and criticisms of family-maintenance systems); Michelle
Harris, Why a Limited Family Maintenance System Could Help American “Grandfamilies”:
A Response to Kristine Knaplund’s Article on Intestacy Laws and their Implications for
Grandparents Raising Grandchildren, 3 NAELA J. 239, 252–55 (2007) (same). In short, the
idea of enacting a family-maintenance statute in the United States is simply a nonstarter. See
DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 44, at 562 (“Although the debate has consumed many
pages in the law reviews, there is no credible proposal pending in any state in this country to
adopt a family maintenance system . . . . ”).
179.
See Johnson, supra note 113, at 120 (noting that, “if providing for dependents
or close family members is an important social goal,” it would be preferable to do so directly
rather than doing so through “the current situation in which courts evidence hostility toward
testamentary plans that do not comport with such social norms”); Spivack, supra note 112, at
246, 305–07 (“If we care about protecting families, let legislatures institute forced heirship.”).
180.
Certainly, a different percentage, such as one-quarter or one-third, could be
workable as well.
181.
I would not, however, go so far as recommending that the forced intestate share
extend all the way to escheating a portion of the estate to the government. As noted above,
the purpose of escheat is not to fulfill the decedent’s likely distributive preferences, but rather
it is simply administratively necessary to transfer the estate to some entity, and the
government is the best available option. See supra notes 148–151 and accompanying text.
Thus, decision-makers are unlikely to manipulate doctrines in order to effectuate escheat.
Because the principle danger of doctrinal manipulation is not present in these cases, the
proposed solution is unnecessary. Thus, the proposed system of forced intestacy should not
operate in cases where the intestate taker would be the government.
182.
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-103(a)(3) (amended 2010).
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and Eleanor. The final distribution would be 23% each to Abraham, Bethany,
Caitlin, and Francis and 4% each to David and Eleanor.183
This type of arrangement would reduce a decision-maker’s temptation to
invent a reason to invalidate the entire will because it “unfairly” excluded two
siblings. Ninety-two percent of the estate would go to the intended recipients—
Abraham, Bethany, Caitlin, and Francis. By forcing the distribution of the other 8%
to unwanted recipients—David and Eleanor—the forced intestate share has
purchased some insurance against the judge or jury throwing out the entire will
because it offended the decision-maker’s general sense of moral fairness or familial
obligation. The judge or jury may now be inclined to say, “At least each sibling got
something. I’m okay with letting the rest of this will stand.” The net gain to Tonya’s
testamentary freedom may well outweigh the cost of distributing a small portion of
the estate to two of her siblings against her expressed wishes.
While this proposal shares similarities with forced-succession systems in
civil law countries,184 it is broader because it protects all potential heirs to the full
extent of the jurisdiction’s intestacy statute, rather than the narrower band of
descendants protected by most systems of forced succession. For example, the
forced-succession system in France protects only the decedent’s descendants from
disinheritance (or the surviving spouse in the absence of descendants).185 Depending
on the decedent’s family situation and the jurisdiction’s intestacy statute, the forcedintestate-share proposal could potentially require the distribution of a share of the
estate to more distant heirs, including ancestors or lateral kin.186
This proposal also shares similarities with the elective share,187 but again it
is broader. Through the elective share, however, we already have experience with
forcing testators to leave portions of their estates to family members. It is not a
totally foreign concept. We’ve ironed out the mechanics for how to make these
forced distributions administratively workable in the context of surviving
spouses.188 The forced intestate share would simply extend a version of the electiveshare system to additional heirs.
183.
Of course, David or Eleanor (or both) could disclaim their 4% shares. They
are not required to take anything. Thus, in a case in which family circumstances were such
that a particular distribution was not sensible, the would-be intestate taker could simply
decline her portion of the forced intestate share. For example, if David was very wealthy and
close to death, and his will called for his estate to be distributed to his siblings, he may wish
to disclaim his portion of Tonya’s estate because it would be subject to estate taxes when he
died.
184.
See supra Section I.C.
185.
See supra notes 57–60 and accompanying text.
186.
See supra Subsection III.B.1.
187.
See supra Subsection III.B.2.
188.
See supra Subsection III.B.2. Certainly, a more complex forced-intestateshare system could be devised that more closely mirrors the elective share system by, for
example, taking into account nonprobate transfers. The goal of this Article is not to design all
of the intricacies of the forced-intestate-share system; rather, the goal is to pose the question
of whether forcing some intestate share would actually increase decedents’ overall freedom
of testation.
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In cases of married testators, the intestate taker would be the surviving
spouse anyway, and the forced intestate share would make up an overlapping portion
of the elective share. In cases of unmarried testators, the forced intestate share would
go to the testator’s children, if any exist. This result would alleviate some of the
concerns of the many critics of the current system in which decedents may cease
providing for their minor children.189 In most cases, the forced intestate share would
have no effect on the actual distribution of a testator’s estate because, in most cases,
a testator will have already provided more for her close family members in her will
than the forced intestate share requires.190
It is only those testators who break from societal norms and attempt to
distribute their estates in counter-majoritarian ways that will be materially affected
by the forced-intestate-share proposal. But these testators are actually buying
something with that forced intestate share. They are paying a tribute to the societal
norm of familial support in exchange for a greater likelihood that the rest of their
nonconformist estate plans will be left undisturbed. They are giving up a share of
their alleged testamentary freedom in exchange for something closer to actual
testamentary freedom with the remainder of their estates.191

CONCLUSION
Judges and juries in probate contests have shown themselves biased in
favor of distributions that align with their preferences. For most folks, this is not a
problem because they more or less share the same preferences as the decision-maker.
But for testators who actually seek to exercise their testamentary freedom through
unpopular devises, this bias often manifests itself to the detriment of their clearly
expressed testamentary preferences.

189.
See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
190.
See Hirsch & Wang, supra note 24, at 14 (noting that “the majority of
testators . . . have no desire to make unorthodox bequests”). If Tonya, the testator in the
example from a few paragraphs above, had left at least 4% of her estate to each of her five
siblings, then the proposal would have no effect on the distribution.
191.
Under the current system, counter-majoritarian testators could consider
forcing something approximating an intestate share onto themselves. In other words, they
could attempt to purchase some measure of testamentary freedom by leaving a share of their
estate to surviving family members. A testator who desires to leave her entire estate to a
controversial organization that contests germ theory may want to consider splitting her estate
and leave a sizable chunk to her family. Keeping some of the wealth in the family may satisfy
the judge or jury’s notion of fairness and keep the anti-germ-theory devise from being
invalidated wholesale.
Testators paying tribute to familial support on an ad hoc basis would likely not carry
the same weight with judges and juries as forcing an intestate share through a statutory reform.
One of the benefits of enacting it as a statute is that decision-makers will, perhaps, be more
likely to consider the statutory percentage to be adequate to fulfill the testator’s duty of
familial support. If, for example, the statute requires 30% of the estate to be distributed in
intestacy, decision-makers may assume that 30% is a fair and appropriate amount. However,
if a testator leaves 30% of her estate to her family on her own accord, the decision-maker
lacks the statutory grounding point. In that situation, the decision-maker may be more likely
to deem 30% insufficient and more tempted to invalidate the balance of the testator’s devises.
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This is especially a problem when a testator seeks to devise a portion of the
estate directly to an organization that champions an unpopular idea. Judges and
juries are prone to give into the temptation to invalidate such devises and to go so
far as to label the testator’s unpopular beliefs “delusional.” These types of devises
should not be invalidated under the doctrine of insane delusions. Instead, devises
that seek to advance a particular viewpoint should be carried out, no matter whether
society at large considers the viewpoint wrongheaded.
Additionally, the time may have come for us to admit that the law of wills
in the United States is not as committed to the principle of testamentary freedom as
it often espouses to be. A latent norm of familial support exists and is expressed by
judges and juries who manipulate flexible doctrines to achieve distributions to the
decedent’s family members. Instead of relying upon this shadowy system of ad hoc
enforcement, perhaps it is time for the law to expressly reserve a share of every
decedent’s estate for distribution to the decedent’s family. The proposal set forth in
this Article—the forced intestate share—would compel distribution of a portion of
each estate to the decedent’s intestate takers. Adopting some version of this proposal
may actually provide testators with greater testamentary freedom overall because,
by expressly fulfilling the norm of familial support, it would reduce decisionmakers’ biased tendencies to invalidate devises to nonfamily members. Indeed, the
counterintuitive solution to achieving greater testamentary freedom may actually be
to remove testators’ control over some share of their estates through a forced
intestate share.

